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other, and stating how they had been answered or might be
obviated.
4. Narrowing the case down to its turning-points by eliminating all questions in regard to which there seemed to remain no
serious doubt, and plainly and fully stating the few points of
doubt upon which the case must turn.
5. Reading from his minutes in detail the important testimony
bearing upon these leading points.
6. Posting up and balancing all the evidence and leaving it
freely and fairly to the determination of the jury.
The charge was, on the whole, a model in its way, both in
matter and manner.
I. F. R.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of New York, at Nisi Prius.
SANBORN v. HERRING AND OTHERS.
Where a manufacturer keeps his wares ready made for sale to customers, he
stands in the same relation to a purchaser, as to warranty, as any other merchant
selling the same article. There is no implied warranty of quality arising from the
mere fact that the seller is also the maker.
Where a manufacturer of burglar-proof safes exhibits two safes differing in price,
and the customer takes the cheaper one upon the assurance that it is equally secure
as a protection against burglars, which proves to be untrue, the purchaser may
recover the difference between the value of the safe as it was and the value of such
a safe as it was represented to be.
But if a safemaker sells a safe with an express warranty that it is burglar-proof,
or upon representations to that effect fraudulently made to the purchaser, with
intent that they should form part of the contract, the purchaser may recover the
value of the money or goods lost by the breaking and robbing of his safe.

THIS case was tried at the last April circuit in New York,
before the Hon. NOAH DAVIS, of the Supreme Court, and a jury.
It arose out of the following facts. On Saturday night, the 27.th
August, 1864, the plaintiff's safe was, broken open at Sterling,
Illinois, and robbed by burglars of $30,000 in money and government bonds. He had purchased the safe in March, 1862, at
the agency in Chicago, of the well-known safe manufacturers,
Herring & Co. of New York. The action was brought to recover
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826,405, the portion of the properjty lost which belonged to the
plaintiff, on the ground that the safe was, when sold to him, warranted burglar-proof. There was no written warranty, and the
evidence in respect to the sale was substantially as follows:
Plaintiff called at defendants' store, saw the agent in charge;
told him that he was in the exchange and agency business at Sterling, that he had a fire-proof safe, but not considering it sufficiently secure against robbers, was in the habit of taking his
money home with him at night; that his place of business was in
a warehouse somewhat isolated, in which no one slept, and that lie
wanted a safe in which he could leave his money without anxietya burglar-proof safe. Something also appears to have been said
about his going iuto the banking business.
The agent then exhibite d several safes, two of which only were
of a size that suited the plaintiff. These two were alike except
in the locks. They were fire-proof safes, with an inner chest
called the burglqr-proof chest, having a brass plate upoV it lettered
c BURGLA-PROOF." The one had a lock known as the Hall lock,
a key-lock;, the other had the Weimar lock, which was a ciombination lock without a key. The prices asked were $850 for the safe
with the Hall lock, and 842 for the other. Plaintiff selected the
cheaper one; upon the representation, as he testified, of the agent
that it was as good as the other,.but" only after inducing him to
* take '$800 for it. He further testified that at the close of the
Tegotiation he iaid to the. agent, "I suppose you warrant these
safes ;" who replied, "Of course ;" that he then said; "But suppose I lose my money, what then ?" and that the agent replied,
*"No such event will occur ;" and that he then paid for the safe and
received a bill of it. The agent denied that anything was said
about a warranty, stated, that he never warranted safes, in fact
had been expressly instructed by his principals not to do so. It
also appeared from other evidence that it was not usual for any
manufacturer to Warraut his safep as burglar-proof.
The burglary was discovered on, the Sunday afternoon after it
occurred, and near the safe were found several ehisels, a heavy
sledge, a crowbar, and a pick-axe, the tools used in the operation.
After the outer or fire-proof safe had been opened, the spindle of
the look on the inner chest was driven through the door, the lock
itself shattered by the blows of the sledge, and control thus
obtained over the bolts which were readily drawn. It was the
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lock, with its fastenings, which proved to be the weak point. The
chest itself was not damaged.
Evidence was then given by the plaintiff to show that other
locks were more secure, and that the lock in question might have
been more strongly protected, and that defendants themselves
manufactured a much better class of burglar-proof safes. To this
was added the testimony of one of the accomplices, who kept
watch outside, that the robbery was accomplished within half an
hour.
The defendants claimed that there was no warranty in fact, that
the agent had no authority to warrant, that the safe was well
made and of good material, that the lock was a good lock against
picking and powder, had been used many years and never before
been driven in, and that plaintiff selected it on his own judgment
on account of its cheapness.
The court (-Avis, J.) charged the jury as follows':It is claimed on the part of the plaintiff that an implied warranty results from the statements he made as to his business and
his requirements in respect to a safe ; from the fact that the defendants were manufacturers of safes, and as manufacturers and
vendors of the article, kept them on hand for sale; that a different
rule is applicable to them than would apply to one who kept the
same safes simply as a seller to customers, he himself being a
buyer from the manufacturers. But I do not so understand the
law. The law applicable to manufacturers who keep their own
articles ready made and completed for sale is the same as where
a third person, not a manufacturer, keeps and sells the same article. The confusion upon that subject has grown out of the fact
that where parties order articles to be made by manufacturers, a
different rule of law is applicable. There the party who orders the
article to be made and the maker do not stand in the relation of
warrantor and warrantee, that is to say, the contract under which
they respectively act is not one of simple warranty.
If you order a party to make a particular article in his line,
and he undertakes to make it in pursuance of your order, there
is simply an executory agreement between you and him, by which
he undertakes to deliver you such an article as you have ordered,
t We have condensed the charge somewhat in places where the learned judge
elaborated his propositions to make them clear to the jury.
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and if he fails to deliver such an article as you have ordered, there
is a breach of that executory agreement. He promises that when
he gets ready to deliver the article to you it shall be such an one
as you ordered, and if he fails to keep that promise, you are under
no obligation to take the article.
If, on the discovery of defects unknown at the time of the
delivery, you return the article, you may recover back the money
which you have paid for it, because of his failure to perform his
executory agreement.
There is nothing in this case that calls for the application of
these principles of law. Here was a party calling at a store
where a large number of safes completed were kept on sale. His
rights and the rights of the sellers are precisely the same as
though the latter were in no wise connected with the manufacturers. Unless there was, therefore, a warranty, that is, an agreement between the parties in respect to the present condition and
character of the articles sold, there is no right of action.
There can be no right of action springing out of the simple fact
that the person selling the article was also its maker. * * * *
After stating the rule of caveat em'ptor and the distinction
between mere laudatory representations and a warranty, the court
proceeded:If you find that the iepresentations testified to as to having been
made by the agent were made as assertions of the peculiar quality
and character of the safe he was selling, with the intention to
make them a part of the contract as to those qualities or conditions-then they amount in law to a warranty that the safe was
such as was then represented. Undoubtedly, a party might make
a contract in a case of this kind that would be obligatory upon
him for all the contents during all the time the safe might be in'
.use, unless the Statute of- Linlitations interposed; that would
subject him to liability for the loss of anything that might at
any sutsequent time be taken from the safe. Such a contract
would be substantially a contract of insurance. If defendants
choose to make contracts of that character with their customers,
engagements that they would undertake and agree, or warrant or
guarantee, or in any form of expression bind themselves, that a
safe sold should at all times both then and in future, when in use,
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be a perfect protection against the attempts of burglars, it was
clearly in their power to do so.
Such a contract as that we can readily imagine would not very
likely be made by a party who simply sold a safe at his ordinary
price, and, still less so, by one who sold, as in this case, at a
diminished sum from the ordinary rates. For, to assume a responsibility of this kind in selling a safe to a banker who is accustomed
to deposit large sums of money in his safe, might be extremely
onerous and severe. The seller might make himself responsible
for millions. Notwithstanding, if he chose to make such a contract, the law would hold him to it, in the absence of any statute
prohibiting a party from becoming an insurer of that kind of
business.
It is not claimed by the counsel for the plaintiff that a contract
of that kind was made in this case. But he claims that it was
agreed between the parties that this safe was a security adequate
for plaintiff's business to this extent, that it contained all the
appliances for security that skill in the manufacturing of safes of
this kind had attained to at the period when the safe was sold,
that is to say, that it was a well-made safe, secure in respect to
fire and against the efforts of burglars, in so far as the manufacturing of safes of that character had attained security at that
period.
In order to entitle the plaintiff to recover on this theory, it is
essential that you should find that such a contract as that was
made, that such was the understanding or agreement of these
parties at the time the safe was sold.
Now, you are to bear in mind in considering that question, that
the safe sold was the cheapest of the three safes of this character
exhibited. One of them, the plaintiff says, he rejected as too
large for his purposes; the other, which was of the same size as
that purchased and had upon it the Weimer lock, he says, was not
taken by him because the agent represented to him that the one
he took with the cheaper lock, the Hall lock, being identical in
all other respects, was equally as good for his business, and he
therefore purchased the cheaper one.
This evidence was put in, I suppose, for the purpose of satisfying you that a representation was made equivalent to stating that
the difference in price was of no particular importance as between
those two safes, one being equally as secure as the other.
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Ordinarily we should not expect that where safes or articles of
manufacture of any kind are of different grades, each class having
its price, depending upon the mode of manufacture, the thickness
of material, the character and expensiveness of the lock, that the
cheaper article would be just as good as the more expensive one,'
because if that were true in point of fact, then the cheapest would be
also in fact the best, since less money would buy as good an article as the highest sum would command.
It is claimed- on the part of the defendants that the safes they
had 6n sale in Chicago, as well as those they make generally,
were graded and classified, and that the price depended upon the
aniount of labor expended upon them, the quantity of iron, and
other material used, and the expensiveness of the locks put upon
them,. and these facts are elements of importance for you to consider as bearing upon the question of the probalility of their
making such a warranty as is claimed here; hence it is a subj9ot
proper for your consideration, whether or not it was "understood
as part of the contract between the parties, that the cheapest safes
contained that degree of security and those appliances by way of
protection against burglars, which the skill of manufacturers of
the article had attained at that time.
If such representations were made, and made with -the intent
of having the party purchase relying upon them as a part of the
agreement, that this safe did contain all those appliances, and
was just as secure a safe as the best that could be purchased, you
will, as a matter of course, have no difficulty in .coming to the
conclusion that the warranty so made was broken, as the evidence
shows clearly that this safe did not contain all the precautions
and securities that higher-priced safes did.
If you find there was such a warranty, then the counsel for the
plaintiff claims that he is entitled to recover at all events, a sum
equal to the difference between the value of the safe as it was and
the value of such a safe' as it was represented 'to be, as he very
clearly would be.
But he claims also, that if you come to the conclusion that this
representatation .was made falsely, knowing it to be false, then the
damages may expand to include the whole sum that the'plaintiff
lost from the safe.
I am inclined to hold with him, that if you find the representations were made with the intention. that they should form a part
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of the agreement. between the parties, and also that they were
fraudulent, that is to say, that they were known to be untrue at
the time they were made, and were made with intent to deceive,
then the damages may be expanded, as he claims; for if the
defendants, the manufacturers, did put upon the market a safe
which they knew had not the substantial qualities that they represented it to have in their general circulars, and their agent at the
time of making the sale falsely represented that it had those
qualities, then, I think, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover
his full claim in this case. The plaintiff's counsel claims that
that would be fraud. I think it would. It is substantially a fraud
if a man who makes any article, knowingly makes it without the
qualities that it professes to possess, and puts it upon sale, and
represents to the buyer, with intent to deceive him, that it does
possess those qualities.
It would be of no moment in such a case whether the agent who
made the sale knew it was a fictitious or a real article. If the
principal places in the hands of his agent a fictitious article,
thereby deceiving the agent himself, so that the latter innocently
represents it to be the real and substantial thing that the buyer is
seeking, and so contracts with the buyer that it is such, then, want
of knowledge on the part of the agent is of no importance whatever, for the principal who sets the agent in motion has rendered
himself responsible, quite independently of the agent's ignorance
or knowledge.
In this case it is not claimed that the agent is guilty of any
fraud, because there is no proof he had any knowledge that this
safe was not what it claimed to be. But the plaintiff claims that
you are justified in finding that the defendants who made these
chests knew that they were not such as they were representing
them to the public to be, and as their agent, under their authority,
was justified in representing them to purchasers to be.
It is for you to pass upon this question, from the evidence in
the case, and upon your conclusion on this question of fraud, even
on the theory which the plaintiff's counsel presents to you, will
depend your right to permit the plaintiff to recover his full loss,
or to limit his recovery, if you find a warranty simply, to the
difference between the value of the chest as it really was and as
it was represented to be. * * * * * *
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The verdict was for the defendants, a finding of course that there
was neither warranty nor fraud.
The foregoing case we have thought
sufficiently novel in some of its features,
to justify a more extended notice than
is usually given tor cases at Nisi Prius.
A case of remarkable similarity is
Walker v. Milner, tried in London, in
1866, before Lord Chief Justice CocBnuw, and reported in 4- Poster &IFinlason 745. The difference, however, in
the handling of the two cases by the
counsel and the court is worthy of note.
The plaintiff was a London jeweller,
and in 1858 went to the shop of defendants, safe manufacturers, saw their foreman, stated his business, said that he
did not reside on the premises or leave
any one to sleep there; and that as the
whole building was left unoccupied at
night, and so left from Saturday night
to Monday morning, he desired a -safe
on the security of which he could entirely rely.
There was a- similar conflict of evidence as to whither there was a warranty in fact, which the foreman denied.
* -He also testified that he had no authority
to warrant. The safe was purchased in
1858, and was not opened till February,
1864, more than six years afterwards.
The point.was taken that the action was
barred by the Statute of Limitations, but
this and all other points of law were
reserved.
The declaration alleged that defendants agreed to sell to plaintiff a certain
iron safe, and promised that it was sufficiently strong to resist any'attempt or
violence that might be made upon it by
thieves, and plaintiff's counsel claimed
that a warranty of this absolute character was established by the evidence, and
Oh this question the care was submitted to
the jury. No question of fraud was made
in the case. Plaintifls' loss was stated
at 60001., and he claimed to recover this

amount on the mere proof that the safe
was opened, and the property stolen,_
but the verdict was for the defendants.
A very valuable note by the reporter is
appended to the case.
It seems to us that the position of the
counsel for the plaintiff in the American
case was much the more judicious. An
undertaking against all possible force and
skill of all future burglars is so much more
like a contract of insurance than one of
warranty, that we doubt whether such
an undertaking would ever be held by
the courts to be created by general words of warranty. A warranty
has reference, generally, to the character and qualities of the thing warranted, not to the acts of third persons. But a contract of .insurance
does provide against perils of robbers
as well as perils of the elements. A
contract of insurance, however, im-.
plies a premium paid for the risk assumed, in proportion to the amount of
the risk, and ejso a fixed term of insurance. All these elements were wanting
in the contracts of warranty sit up in
the cases before us. Ther6 is great force,
however, in the position that a manufacturer who sells a safe, as a fire-proof
or burglar-proof safe, thereby represents.
that its securities against fire or burglary are as complete as-the experience
of those engaged in the business can
make them. But it also follows that as
soon as the warranty is construed as one,
not of absolute, but only of comparative
security, then the manufacturer is let in
to show that the purchaser can only ask
as much security as he is willing to pay
for.
In the English case, there does not
appear to have been any point raised as
to the measure of damages. Both court
and counsel seem to have assumed that
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if the plaintiff was entitled to recover,
he was entitled to recover the value
of his lost property, 60001. This
point, however, would appear to have
been sharply contested in the case
in New York, and the plaintiff's counsel did not claim that he was entitled to anything more than the difference between the value of the safe
purchased and that of such a safe as the
representations entitled him to, unless
the jury found a fraudulent warranty
by defendants. Even then, however,
we do not see how under a contract of warranty, damages so remote,
contingent, and uncertain, as a loss
caused by burglars can be recovered.
The general rule is, that the parties are
deemed to contemplate such damages,
as the creditor may suffer from the nonperformance of the obligation in respect
to the particularthing which is the object of it; and not such as arise collaterally. The damages may be enhanced,
it is true, where the conduct of the party
in fault has been fraudulent, where property has been sold for a particular use,
and in other cases, but we know of no
case where, for a breach of warranty,
damages have been held recoverable, so
far in excess of the amount involved in
the original transaction, as the damages
claimed in these actions.
The point under the Statute of Limitation did not arise in the American case.
If the warranty was, as there contended,
that the safe had at the time of sale all
the qualities of the best made safes, and
it had not, it would seem that the warranty was broken at once, and the statute would run from the time of sale.
But if the contract was that the safe
would resist all attacks of burglars, then
there was no cause of action till it was
opened. But, the question arises, whether such a contract may not be within the
Statute of Frauds, in respect to contracts
VoL. XV.-30

to be performed within a year. If the
contract were fully expressed as a contract that the seller would be liable for.
say six years, for all attempts of burglars, it would seem clearly to be within
the statute.
The proposition in the American case
that a contract made with a manufacturer for an article already made and on
sale is to be treated in the same way as
if made with a vendor who is not the
manufacturer, seems sound, and is supported by several English cases : Olivant
v. Bayley, 5 Q. B. 287; Prideaux v.
Bennett, 1 C. B. N. S. 613 ; Chanterv.
Hopkins, 4 31. & W. 398; and see Hoe
v. Sanborn, 21 N. Y. 553.
In both cases, there was evidence that
the warranty or representations alleged
to have been made were not within the
authority of the agent who made the
sale. It is frequently said in the books
that an agent who is authorized to sell
is authorized to warrant, but the statement should clearly be limited to cases
where the article is customarily sold with
warranty: Dingle v. Hare, 7 C. B. N.
S. 145.
Where, however, an agent to sell warrants without authority, or makes fraudulent representations which induce the
purchase, there is a tendency, lately, to
hold that the principal, by receiving the
purchase-money, must be held to have
sanctioned all the instrumentalities by
which the sale was effected: Udell v.
Atherton, 7 H. & N. 172 ; Bennett v.
JTudson, 21 N. Y. Rep. 238. There
seems some color for holding that the
principal may be liable to refund what
he has received by virtue of the contract,
but he certainly should not be held liable for remote and consequential damages resulting from an act which he did
not authorize, and of which he was entirely innocent. The point we think
remains to be finally settled.
D.
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,

jupreme Court of tke United States.
TOBIAS S. BRADLEY ET AL.v. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
ILLINOIS.
Shares in national banks can be taxed for state, county, or municipal purposes,
only when the state legislation authorizing such taxation conforms to the provisoes
of the 41st section of the National Bank Act of June 1864.
. The case of Van. Allen v. The Assessors, 3 Wallace 573, s.c., 5 Am. Law Beg.
(N. S.) 609, reaffirmed and followed in Bradley v. Te People, and 7he People,
4-c.,
ex rd. Duer v. The Commissioners.
The second proviso of the 41st section construed in the case of Bradley v. The
People, and applied to the laws of Illinois.
The hfrst proviso in said section construed and expounded in the.case of 7e
People, 4-c., ex rel. Duaer v. The Commissioners.

Iw.error to the Supreme Court of the state of Illinois.Mr. Justice NELsoN delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
The case came before that court on an appeal from a decision
of the board of supervisors of the couity of Peoria, by which
they had refused to assess a state and county tax on the shares
of Bradley and Howell in the First and Second National Banks
of Peoria. The appeal was taken by the auditor of public
accounts-, in behalf of the state.
. The Supreme Court reversed this decision of the board, and
held the shareholders liable to the tax. The ground of exemption
relied on, both before the supervisors and the Supreme Court,
was want of authority in the board, within the 41st section of the
National Bank A.ct of June, 1864, and particularly within the
second proviso of that section, which declares that the tax "shall
not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks
organized. under the authority of the states."
The act of the state, dated February 14th 1857, provides for
taxing the capital stook of the -banks, together with the surplus
profits or reserved funds. No tax is imposed specifically on the
shares held by the stockholder.
This question.came- before us in the case of Fan Allen v. The
Assessors, 3 Wallace 573, 581, from New York, where the statute
taxing the state banks was substantially like that of Illinois. We
there held the tax unauthorized for the defect stated.
It was in that case attempted to be sustained on the same
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ground relied on here, that the tax on the capital was equivalent
to tax on the shares, as respected the shareholders. But the
position was answered that, admitting it to be so, yet, inasmuch
as the capital of the state banks may consist of the bonds of the
United States, which were exempt from state taxation, it was not
easy to see that the tax on the capital was an equivalent to a tax
on the shares. We see no distinction between the two cases, and
the judgment of the court below must be reversed, and the proceedings remanded, with directions to enter a judgment affirming
the decision of the board of supervisors.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK EX REL. DENNING
DUER v. THE COMMISSIONERS OF TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS
FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF NEW YORK..
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK EX REL. RALPH
MEAD v. THE COMMISSIONERS OF TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS
FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF NEW YORK.
[For head-note see Bradley v. Illinois, ante, p. 466.]

IN error to the Court of Appeals of the state of New York.
Mr. Justice NLsoN delivered the opinion of the court.
These cases are writs of error to the Court of Appeals of the
state of New York. The relator in the first is an owner of one
hundred and fifty-two shares of stock in the National Bank of
Commerce in New York.
The capital of the bank consists of one hundred thousand shares
of $100 each, and is invested in United States securities,
and exempt from state taxation. The commissioners of taxes, in
making their assessments, valued the shares at par, and imposed
upon them the same rate of tax as was imposed upon other personal property in this city. The commissioners, in their return
to the certiorari,state that in estimating the value of the shares
they made no deduction on account of the investment of the capital of the bank in United States securities. That in the valuation
of the personal estate of individuals, these securities held and
owned by them were deducted and the tax assessed on the balance; and the like deductions were made from the capital of
insurance companies.
The assessment of this tax on the shares of the relator in the
Bank of Commerce was carried to the Supreme Court of the state,
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and after argument, was. affirmed, and thence to the Court of
Appeals, where the judgment of the Supreme Court was affirmed.
The case is now here on error under the 25th section of the
Judiciary Act.
The first objection taken to the legality of the tax is on the
ground that the commissioners, in. the valuation of the shares,
refused to deduct the amount of capital of the bank invested in
United States securities, and, hence, refused to regard this
deduction in the valuation of the shares.
This question has heretofore been considered by this court, and,
after full deliberation, determined, in the case of Yan Allen v.
The Asseso8o, 8 Wallace 573, and need not again be exanfned.
That case was one of a large class of cases which were very thoroughly argued, and received, at the time, the most careful examination of the court.
The next, and, perhaps, the only material question in the case,
arises upon a construction of a clause in the first proviso of the
41st section of the National Bank Act. After referring to the
taxation of these shares by state authority, it provides: "but
not at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed calpital
in the hands of individual citizens of such states."
It is argued, that the assessment upon the shares of the relator
is at a greater rate than that of the personal property of individual citizens, upon the ground that allowance was made on
account of United States securities held and owned by them,
when at the same time the deduction was disall6wed io him.
The answer is, that upon a true construction of this clause of
the act, the meaning and intent of the law-makers were, that the
rate of taxation of the shares should be the same, or not greater,
than upon the moneyed capital of the individual citizen which is
subject or liable to taxation. That is, no greater proportion or
percentage of tax in the valuation of the shares should be levied
than upon other moneyed taxable capital in the hands of the
citizens.
This rule seems to be as effectual a test to prevent unjust
discrimination against the shareholders, as could well be devised.
It embraces, a class which constitutes the body politic of the state,
who make its laws and provide for its taxes. These cannot be
greater than the citizens impose upon themselves., It is known
that in accordance with sound policy in every well regulated and
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enlightened state or government, certain descriptions of property,
and also certain institutions-such as churches, hospitals, academies, cemeteries, and the like-are exempt from taxation; but
these exemptions have never been regarded as disturbing the rates
of taxation, even where the fundamental law had ordained that it
should be uniform. The objection is a singular one. At the time
Congress enacted this rule as a limitation against discrimination,
it was well known to that body, that these securities in the hands
of the citizen were exempt from taxation. It had been so held
by this court, and, for abundant caution, had passed into a law.
The argument founded on the objection, if it proves anything,
proves that these securities should have been taxed in the hands
of individuals to equalize the taxation ; and, hence, that Congress
by this clause in the proviso intended to subject them, as thus
situated, to taxation; and, therefore, there was error in the
deduction. This we do not suppose is claimed. But if this is
not the result of the argument, then, the other conclusion from it
is, that Congress required that the commissioners should deduct
the securities, and at the same time intended the deduction, if made,
should operate as a violation of the rate of the tax prescribed.
We dissent from both conclusions, and think a sound construction of the clause, and one consistent with its words and intent, is
also consistent with all the Acts of 6ongress on the subject.
The commissioners, in their return, state that insurance companies created under the laws of the state, and doing business in
the city of New York, were respectively assessed upon the balance
of their capital and surplus profits, liable to taxation, after
deducting therefrom such part as is invested in United States
securities.
Another objection taken is, that the taxation of the shares of
the relator is illegal, on account of this deduction-it being a
departure from the rate of assessment prescribed in the clause
already cited.
The answer is, that this clause does not refer to the rate of
assessments upon insurance companies as a test by which to prevent discrimination against the shares; that is confined to the
rate of assessments upon moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens. These institutions are not within the words or the
contemplation of Congress: but even if they were, the answef
we have already given to the deduction of these securities in the
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assessment of the property of individual citizens is equally applicable to them. These companies are taxed on their capital, and
not on the shareholder, at the same rate as other personal property in the state. There is not much danger to be apprehended
of a discriminating tax in their favor, prejudicial to the rights or
property of the citizen, and, of course, to the rights of the shareholders in these national banks, who stand on the same footing.
The relator in the second case, Ralph Mead, is the holder and
owner of twenty-five shares of stock in the Cor Exchange Bank
in the city of New York, incorporated under the laws of the
itate.
*TheAct of April 23d 1866 imposed a tax on the shares of these
banks.

It is insisted that the tax is illegal on account of the refusal of
the commissioners to deduct the United States securities, in which
a portion of the capital stock of the bank was invested.
The general question was distinctly presented in the bank cases
of the last term, of which Van Allen v. The Assessors, 8.Wallace
578, 588, and 584, was one of the class, and disposed of.. It was
there said: "but, in addition to this view, the tax on the shares
is not a tax on the capital of the bank. The corporation is' the
legal owner of all the property of the bank, real irid personal;
and within the powers conferred upon it by the charter, and for
the purposes for which it was created, can deal with the corporate
property as absolutely as a private individual can deal with his
own.
"The interest of the shareholder entitles him to participate in
the net profits earned by the bank, in the employment of its
capital, during the existence of its charter, in proportion to the
number of his shares; and upon its dissolution or termination, to
his proportion of the propeity. that may remain, of the corporation, after the payment of its debts. This is a distinct, independent interest or property, held by the shareholder like any other
property that may belong to him;" and, we add, of course, is
subject to like taxation.
It was supposed, on the argument, that this principle was in
conflict with that which governed the decision of this court in the
case of Gardnerv. The Appeal Taz OCourt, 8 How. 138, but this
is a mistake.
That case turned upon the construction of an act of Maryland
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exempting the bank from taxation on account of a large bonus to
the state for the extension of the charter. This court held, that
upon a true construction of the act, the stockholders were within
the scope of the exemption.
The court say: "In whatever way we examine the Acts of 1818
and 1821, we are of opinion that it appears from the 11th section
in those acts, to have been the intention of the legislatures which
passed them, to exempt the stockholders from taxation as persons,
on account of the stock which they owned in the banks."
Some other questions were discussed on the argument besides
those we have noticed, but they are questions over which this
court cannot take cognisance. We have examined all of them
that are here under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act.
Judgment of the court below affirmed.

Mr. Chief Justice CHAS.---In concurrence with my brothers
WAYNE and SwAYNE, I dissent from the opinion just read. The
reasons of dissent sufficiently appear in our dissenting opinion in
the case of Fan Allen v. Tie Assessors, read at the .last term,
and we do not think it necessary to repeat them.'
Supreme Court of Indiana.
WRIGHT, AUDITOR, AND MEYER, TREASURER OF MARION
COUNTY, v. STILZ..
[For head-note, see Bradley v. Illinois, ante, p. 466.]
APPEAL

from the Marion Circuit Court.

D. -E. Williamson, Attorney-General, for appellant.
Hendricks, Hord & Hendricks, and Porter,Harrison& Fish-

back, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FRAZER, J.-The appellee is a stockholder in the First National
Bank of Indianapolis, a banking association organized in pursuance of an Act of Congress of June 3d 1864, authorizing such
associations. Its capital and surplus are all invested in United
States bonds, and the only question before us upon which a decision is desired is whether the appellee can be taxed upon his shares
I See post, p. 483, note to FrazerY. Sebern.
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of stock under .khe laws of this state now in force for state and
county purposes.
The 41st section of the Act of Congress provides "that nothing
in the act shall be construed.to prevent all shares in any of the
said associations, held by any person or body corporate, froi
being included in the valuation of the personal property of such
person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by or
under state authority, at the place where such bank is located,
and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate than is assessed upon
other moneyed capital in the hands of.individual citizens of such
8tate; provided further, that the tax so imposed under the laws
of any state upon the shares of any of the associations authorized
by this act shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the' shares in
any of the banks organized under authority of the state where
such association is located; provided, also, that nothing in this
act shall exempt the real estate of associations from either state,
county, or municipal taxes to the 'same extent, according to its
value, as other real estate is taxed."
The bortis of the United States in which the capital of the
bank is invested cannot be taxed by state authority. This is too
well settled to admit of debate ; and, indeed, we believe it is not
now questioned in any quarter.
But the shares of the national banks araby the Act of Congress above quoted placed within reach of the taxing power of the
states, subject, however, to certain conditions mentioned in the
act. These conditions were intended to prevent the states, in the
imposition of such taxes, from making any discrimination against
such shares, as compared with other moneyed capital held by
citizens of such states, or as compared with shares in banks existing under the authority of such states.
National banks, then, take their franchises upon the terms that
their shares shall be subject. to the burden of taxation by states,
with certain limitations; and they cannot exist unless they invest
at least one-third of their paid-in capital in United States bonds,
and they may lawfully so invest it all. It seems to result, then,
that by the very act of becoming members of such a banking
association, the shareholders in consideration of the franchises
thus obtained, surrender to the states the abstract right to hold
as exempt from state taxation such shares, and that the power of
the states to tax the shares cannot be, in any sense, dependent
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upon the fact that a part or the whole of the capital of the association is invested in government bonds. If this be not so, it
would be within the power of the bank to defeat entirely the
imposition of the tax upon its shares which the Act of Congress
authorizes, by the easy, safe, and not unprofitable expedient, of
investing its entire capital in such bonds; an operation not prohibited, but rather encouraged by the general scope of that law.
Such a proposition it is proper to say is not now urged by the
learned counsel for the appellee. Indeed it would be in conflict
with the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in
'Van Allen v. The Assessors, 3 Wallace 573, and also in People
ex rel. Duer v. The Commissioners, decided by the same court
only a few days ago (ante, p. 467). The claim that the shares
are exempt from taxation, is based in argument exclusively upon
the provisions of our own local banking laws and revenue system;
and it is contended that under these, the shares of banks of our
state may be withdrawn from taxation, so far as these incorporations shall choose to invest their capital in government securitiesand therefore, under the Act of Congress, the shares of national
banks must possess the like immunity. In W-hitney v. Madison,
23 Ind. 331 we held that a stockholder of a bank organized under
the general banking law of this state-the entire capital and surplus of which were invested in United States bonds-could not be
taxed upon his shares by the city of Madison.
This conclusion. was drawn from two propositions, the first
of which had shortly before been established by the Supreme
Court of the United States in two cases-Bank of Commerce v.
.New York City, 2 Black 620, and Bank Tax Case, 2 Wal. 200;
and the second had been held by this court in King v. Madison, 17 Ind. 48, and Conwell, President,v. City' of Connersville,
15 Ind. 150. These propositions were: 1. That the capital of a
bank invested in United States bonds is not taxable. 2. That a
tax upon the shares of the stock of a bank is merely a mode of
taxing the property of the bank. The ruling in Whitney v.
Madison is unquestioned by counsel, but we have nevertheless
re-examined it, and finding its reasoning to be in conflict with the
late cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States
(Van Allen v. The Assessors, and The People, &c., v. The Commissioners, supra), we yield to these cases as authority by which
we are bound, and which we must obey. It is there expressly
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held that a tax upon the shares is not a tax upon the property
belonging to the corporation.
The greatest current of cases previously decided by the state
courts is believed to be the other way. We cite 10 Mass. 514; 9
Metcalf 199; 4 Zabr. 400; 9 N. H. 423. But in 11 Pick. 513;
the doctrine lately held by the Supreme Court of the United
States is strongly maintained.
We think that as an original proposition, it is in the nature of
things true, that a tax upon the shareholders for the value of their
shares is not a tax upon the property held by the corporation.
If the corporation owns real estate, the stockholders are not on
that account freeholders. The corporation is itself a. separate
person in law, and holds its property in its own right, and not, in
any accurate legal sense, as trustee of the corporators. The
aggregate value of the shares is not measured by the net aggregate value of the assets of the corporation, but may be greatly
more or less. The value of the shares depends mainly upon other
elements, prominent amongst which are the value of the franchises,
the management of the corporate business, and the consequent
profits earned and paid in the form of dividends. To illustrate:
there may be one national 'bank which has a half a million of
assets, and is free from debt, but earns no dividends.- Its shares
will not -sell at par for the reason that money invested in them
would be unproductive capital. Another such bank has equal
assets and equal capital stock, but it clears and divides amongst its
shareholders twenty per cent. per annum. Its shares will probably sell at a large premium-they may be worth $1.50 in the
market, while those of the bank first supposed are unsought at
seventy-five cents. Now if the shares of these corporations are
taxed at their true value, the one will yield only one-half as much
revenue as the other, though the property owned by such corporations is exactly the same in value.
It is, however, true that a -tax upon the property of the bank
required to be paid by the bank, would indirectly affect the shareholders by reducing their dividends. It has not, therefore, been
usual at the same time, to tax a bank upon all its property and
the shareholders also on the value of their shares. It has been
deemed unfair to do so. Indeed, it has been held that a law
exempting a corporation from taxation, also exempted its shareholders from taxation on their shares: 4 Zabr. 400.
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Until recently there has been little occasion in any of our states
to consider the subject of taxation very closely. The wants of
government, both state and national, have been so few, and the
amount of taxes necessary to be collected has consequently been
so small, that even slight inequalities in public burdens of this
kind, if avoidable, have rarely met with legislative sanction or
popular approval, and the courts may have been partakers of the
same feeling, to the extent of leaning a little in favor of the
citizen. But now that there is an enormous national debt, not
taxable by the states, held in the form of public stocks, and
almost every state and county is subject to large liabilities which
must be met by taxation, the matter receives a more careful
scrutiny.
But under existing laws, the shares in national.banks cannot be
taxed in this state for state and county purposes, for the plain
reason that no such tax is "imposed upon the shares of any of the
banks organized under the authority of the state," and the Act
of Congress therefore forbids it. We tax our own banks upon
their paid-in capital, and do not tax the shareholders thereof upon
the value of their shares-: Laws of 1861, p. 17. We would, by
imposing this burden upon the shareholders of the national banks
alone, make the discrimination against the latter, which the
national legislature has, in express terms, probibited. 1
Judgment affirmed with costs.
ELLIOTT, J., was absent.
Supreme Court of Ohio.
JAMES A. FRAZER v. S. W. SIEBERN ET AL .2
Taxation by a state of shares in national banks must conform strictly to the
requirements of the National Bank Act of June 1864.
The Statute of Ohio of April 2d 1865, taxing shares in national banks, imposes
a higher rate of taxation on such shares than on the shares of banks authorized by
the state, and is thereibre unconstitutional.
The subject of taxation of national banks discussed.

ERROR to the Superior Court of Cincinnati.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WELCH, J.-The plaintiffs are shareholders in the First National
Bank of Cincinnati, organized under the Act of Congress of June
I See note at the end of the next case, p. 483.
2 We are indebted for this case to Mr. Critchfield, the Reporter.
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3d 1864.

On. the 2d day of May 1865, their several shares in
the bank were listed on the grand duplicate of Hamilton county,
as a part of their personal property, and assessed for taxation
agreeably to the provisions .of the state law of April 2d 1865
(Vol. 62, p. 106). The assessment is upon the par value of the
shares, and no deduction is made therefrom on account of the
capital or funds of the bank invested in United States bonds,
which are not subject to state taxation, or in real estate, which is
taxed against the bank itself. The case below was a petition filed
by the plaintiffs against the defendants, to enjoin the collection
OT the tax thus assessed upon their shares, and to enjoin the
assessment and collection of like taxes in the future under said
Act of 1865. The court below were of opinion that the tax was
legally assessed, and dismissed the plaintiff's petition, on demurrer
thereto; and the case now comes here, on petition in error, for
decision of the single question whether the court erred in that
opinion.
The Act of Congress authorizing national banks provides, that
c shares" in such banks may be assessed for state taxes, and
taxed as the personal property, of the owners thereof, subject to
two limitations. The first limitation is, that the assessment shall
not be at a greater rate than that imposed upon 1 oth'er moneyed
capital in the hands of individual citizensof the state." The
second is: " That the tax so imposed under the laws of any state,
upon the shares of any of the associations authorized.by this act,
shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the
banks organized under authority of the state where such association is located." The act also provides, that real estate owned
by the banks may be taxed as such by state authority.
The plaintiffs allege that the tax sought to be enjoined is unauthorized by law, and is in violation of both these limitations;
that the moneyed capital of individuals residing in the state is taxed
at a lower rate ; that " shares" in the state banks are not taxed
at all; and that the banks themselves are taxed at a rate lower
than is so assessed upon the plaintiffs. They say that the state
banks are taxed at a lower rate because they are taxed upon their
capital, without including the value of the franchise, or privilege
of banking, and subject to. a deduction for the value of reaZ estate,
and of untaxable bonds of the United States, owned by the
banks.
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At the time this tax was assessed, the banks of issue in this state
consisted of the branch banks and the independent banks, organized under the Act of February 24th 1845, and the free banks,
organized under the Act of April 1851. The Act of 1845 imposes on the state and independent banks a tax of six per cent.
on their profits, in lieu of all other taxes. The Act of April
1861 imposes no restrictions on the power of the legislature to
tax the banks organized thereunder.
The state law of 1865, under which the assessment was made,
requires all persons to list with their other personal property,
moneys, credits, &c., "all shares in national banks located in this
state." (Vol. 62, p. 106.) At the date of this act, and at the
time of the assessment of the present tax under it, the other tax
laws in force in Ohio were, the general Act of 1849 (2 S. & C.
1458) ; the amendatory Act of 1861. (vol. 58 0. L., p. 59) ; and
the Act of 1862 (vol. 59 0. L., p. 3).
By the Act of 1859, all persons are required to list for taxation, among other items of personal property, &c., "all investments in stocks;" but see. 59 of the act provides, among other
exemptions, that no person shall be required to include in the list
of his personal property, &c., "any ghare or portion of the capital
stock or property of any company or association, which is required
to list or return its capital and property for taxation."
The provisions of said Act of 1861, for taxing the banks organized under the Act of 1845, are as follows:
Section 4. It shall be the duty of the president and cashier of
each banking company organized under the act entitled "An Act
to incorporate the State Bank of Ohio, and other banking companies," passed February 24th 1845, on or before the second
Monday of May in each year, to make out under oath, and return
to the proper assessor of the township, town, or ward where such
company is located, a certificate containing a statement of the
amount of the capital stock of such companypaid in and remaining as capital stock undiminished by, loss or otherwise, together
with the amount of surplus and contingent fund and undivided
profits accrued prior to the first Monday in May, and also the
amount loaned to, or deposited with such bank for a term certain,
or which by agreement or understanding between the parties, is
not to be withdrawn on demand, excepting amounts which may
have been deposited with any bank established as a clearing-house

FRAZERt v. SIEBERN.

for the redemption of the notes of banks making such deposits
and on which no interest is charged or received by the banks
making such deposits; and the amount so returned shall be placed
on the county duplicate, and. on the city duplicate where city
taxes are collected on a separate duplicate, and taxed as othei
personal property in the same township, town, village, or ward
may be taxed by law. in making the certificate aforesaid, any
portion of said stock, surplus, or contingentfund; or undivided
profits invested in real estate, which is subject to taxation under
the laws of this state, may be deducted, but the certificate shall
specify the amount so deducted.
By the Act of January 16th 1862, all banks of issue in the
state were authorized temporarily to suspend specie payments and
were relieved from penalties provided in their charters against such
suspension, upon condition that they should, respectively, consent
to be taxed under said Act of 1861. And all the banks organized
under said Act of 1845, gave their consent accordingly, within
the time specified.
Under this state of legislation, was the tax levied upon these
shares authorized by law?
Whether the state has inherent power, without any authority
ffom Congress, to impose an equitable and just tax upon shares or
capital in banks organized under the revenuq laws of the Federal
Government, and whether the power, if it exists, is unlimited,
unless restrained by Congress,- need not be made questions in the
case. The power and the limitation, are both supplied in the Act
of Congress refeiTed to. Nor can the constitutional right of Congress to grant the power, be impugned on the ground that it impairs
the validity of the contract of the government, exempting the
bonds upon which the circulation of the- banks is based, from taxation. Congress had the right to impose this condition as a royalty
annexed to the grant of corporate power, and the corporators, by
acceptance of the grant, have assented to the condition. The
state, therefore, had power to tax these shares according to the
provisions of said Act of Congress.
It is, perhaps, now conceded-although the contrary was originally argued in the case-that the word "shares," used in the
Act of Congress in reference to the national banks, was intended
to be understood in the sense of choses, and not as aliquot parts
of the capital stock of the association. It was used to designate
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the separate and individual property of the owners, and not their
interest in the common property of the bank. The intention was,
to subject these shares to taxation, as such property of the owner,
at their full value, without any deduction on ac.count of the franchise, or for investments of the capital or funds of the bank in
untaxable bonds, or in real estate. That such is the true construction of the act is now well settled by the case of Duer v. The
Commissioners,decided by the Supreme Court of the United States
at its present term, ante, p. 467,and in Van Allen v. The Assessors,
3 Wallace 573. It is not claimed that the plaintiffs are taxed beyond
the value of their " shares" in this sense. They are taxed upon
the par value of the shares, and there is nothing in the case to
show that their real value is any less than par. The tax, then, is
authorized and legal, unless it is in violation of the limitations
imposed by the Act of Congress, by exceeding the rate imposed
upon "moneyed capital" in the hands of individuals, or that
imposed upon " shares in state banks."
As to the first of these limitations there can be no question.
If the shares are to be regarded as choses, and assessed at their
full value, then there can be no violation of the first limitation,
unless they are subjected to a higher percentage of taxation than
other property or capital, at the places where the bank is located,
which is not pretended in the case.
It remains to inquire, whether the tax exceeds the rate imposed
upon the "shares in the banks authorized by the state." This is
the principal question in the case, and it has been elaborately and
ably argued.
It must be premised, that in the cases referred to, the Supreme
Court of the United States have put a more liberal construction
upon the word "1shares," as here used, in favor of the power to
tax, than they have upon the same word when designating shares
in the national banks. That court holds that the equivalent taxation necessary to justify a tax upon the shares in national banks,
may be either upon the shares of the individual stockholders in
the state banks, and assessed against the stockholders, or it may
be upon the capital of the bank, and assessed against the bank
itself; provided only that it be a full equivalent. The tax
against the owners of shares in the national banks must not exceed
that imposed, in some form, upon the state banks or their stockholders. The question is, whether there is such equivalent, in
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either form, in the present case. In other words: Does the Act
of April, 1861, properly construed with reference to provisions in
our constitution on the subject, tax the shares in the state banks,
and as the ehoses or property of the shareholders; or, if not, then
does it tax the banks themselves, upon an amount equal to the
value of such shares without deduction? We are unanimous in
the opinion that both these questions must be answered in the
negative.
The counsel of defendants contend, in the first place, that there
is such equivalent tax imposed upon the banks themselves.
. It is true, as counsel say, that the Act of 1861 may be regarded
as a contract with the banks organized under the Act of 1845,
and that the legislature had full power, as against the banks
organized under the Act of 1861, to impose an equivalent tax.
But it matters not whether we regard the act as a contract, or as
a raw, or what may have been the power of .the legislature-the
question in either case is the same: What is its tfue construction P Does it impose on the banks of the state a tax-equivalent
to that imposed upon the shares in national banks ?
There are three alleged elements of inequality-the franchise,
the real estate, and the investment in United States bonds.

Possibly we may rid the case of the first, by holding that the Act
of'1865 only requires shares in the national banks to be taxed at
their par or nominal value, as they were infact taxed in this
case, and not at their actual or market value, and, therefore, the
value of the franchise is to be excluded.
As to the second element of inequality there can be no controversy. The shares in the national banks are assessed at their
value-either nominal or real-without any deduction for real
estate, which is taxed separately against the bank, as real estate ;
whereas, by express provision in the Act of 1861, the value of
real estate owned by the state banks is to be deducted from their
capital.

But the most important element of difference is the investment
in United States bonds. The Act of 1865 admittedly 'allows no
deduction for bonds owned by the national banks from the valuation of shares to be taxed. Does the Act of 1861 allow such
deduction from the capital of the state banks ? However we
might be disposed to decide this as an original question, we look
upon it as having been settled by decisions of the Supreme Court
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of the United States, and we feel bound by those decisions. In
the case of Van Allen v. The Assessors, and also in The Bank
Tax (iase, 2 Wallace 200, a tax law of New York of 1857, of
similar import, was held to admit of such deduction, and a tax
levied under it upon the capital of the New York state banks,
without deduction for such bonds, was declared by that court to
be unauthorized and illegal. In New York, as in Ohio, the
general ad valorem system of taxation is adopted. In both states
taxes are assessed upon valuations. The New York Statute of
1857 subjected the banks of that state to be taxed upon a valuation, " Equal to the amount of their capital stock paid in or
secured to be paid in, and their surplus earnings;" &c. The
valuation upon which our state and independent banks are to be
taxed, by the law of 1861, is to consist of "The amount of the
capital stock of such companies paid in and remainingas capital
stock undiminished by losses or otherwise, together with the
amount of surplus," &c. The two statutes are substantially the
same; and were we to put a different construction upon ours, it
would only be necessary to take the case to the Supreme Court
of the United States in order to have the decision reversed.
But it is contended in the second place, that the Act of 1861
imposes a tax upon shares in the state banks, as well as upon the
capital of the banks. There is no pretence that the act expressly
taxes shares in the state banks. On the contrary, it is admitted
that by the 59th section of that act, they are expressly exempted.
The argument is, that the exemption is unconstitutional, and must
therefore be rejected; that the true meaning of the constitution
is, that money employed in banking, by associations who dividb
their capital stock into shares, shall be subjected to a species of
double taxation; that it shall be taxed once against the bank, as
its capital, and a second time against the shareholders, as stock
in the bank. We are not called upon to decide this constitutional
question. For the present case it is enough to say, that the constitution does not on such matters execute itself. It does not
levy taxes, but merely prescribes the character of laws, to be
enacted for that purpose by the legislature. Until the laws are
passed, the taxes cannot be levied. The Act of 1861 is not a law
imposing such double taxation, and cannot, upon any admissible
principle, be amended by judicial interpretation into such a law.
It provides for a tax against certain corporations and companies
VOL. XV.--1
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upon'their capital,and for a tax against the shareholders upon their
stock, in those corporations and companies that are not so taxed
upon their capital. No form of words, or arrangement of sections
and sentences in the act, can enable the court, by mere construction, so to amend it, as to bring in a new class of tax-payers, that
is to say, stockholders in corporations and companies that are
taxed, as such, upon their capital. The meaning of the act is
plain, and to alter it in the respect indicated would be to legislate. The intention maxiifestly was, to subject the capital employed by these corporations and associations to a single taxation-some of them in one form, and some in another-and not to
tax any of them twice. It -is the unmistakeable intention manifested in our tax legislation for the last twenty years-the central.
idea of our system of general ad valorem taxation-to taz everyq
person upon what he is worth. In a system like ours, where
intangible as well as tangible property is taxed, some forms of
double taxation are unavoidable; but the object should be-and
such seems to have been the general aim of all our late legislation
on the subject-to avoid double taxation wherever it is practicable, and, as nearly as may be, to tax all according to their actual
wealth. That object is best attained in case of a corporation, or
joint stock company, by taxing the stockholders-the persons
who own its property, upon the full value of their shares therein,
including, of course, their interest in the franchise or privilege,
and in all tangibleproperty owned by the company;. and by taxing the corporation also upon the value of such tangible property.
The stockholders are thus taxed-as all other individuals who
own tangible and intangible property are sometimes unavoidably
taxed-once upon all he is worth, and a second time upon that
part of his property which is tangible. This is the rule adopted
by the Act of Congress in question, and it seems to us to be a
just and fair rule. The Act of 1865, by subjecting shareholders'
in the national banks to such a tax, places upon the owners of
those banks, the shareholders therein, no more than their just
proportion of the public burden of taxation; and we regret that
any technical reasons, growing out of the taxation of the few
remaining state banks, should stand in the way of its enforcement.
We are glad, however, to say, that no such impediments to just
and equal legislation on the subject will exist in the future. The
banks organized under the Act of 1845, now only exist for the
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purpose of closing up their affairs, and are no longer "banks"
within the meaning of the Act of Congress; and the banks organized under the Act of April 1851, are liable to be taxed under
the Constitution of 1851, subject to no limitation in their charters.
It is, perhaps, unnecessary to say, thaf-the word "banks" in the
Act of Congress means incorporated banks, and that the limitation
does not, therefore, apply to private bankers.
We are of opinion that the court erred in sustaining the
demurrer to plaintiffs' petition, and its judgment will, therefore,
be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
It by no means follows, however, that the plaintiffs are entitled
to an unconditional injunction against the collection of the tax.
They ask equity, and must do equity. They invoke the exercise
of an extraordinary power of the court for their relief, and the
court in its discretion should refuse that relief, except upon conditions that are equitable and just. We think, therefore, that the
injunction should only be granted upon the condition that the
plaintiffs, or their bank, shall first pay to the treasurer of Hamilton county a sum that will be a pro rata equivalent for the tax
imposed upon the state and independent banks, under the Act of
1861-that is to say, such sum as night lawfully have been
assessed upon the plaintiffs, or their bank, under said act, had it
been one of the said state banks. If the parties cannot agree upon
this sum, proceedings can be adopted to ascertain it by the court;
and, if found necessary, the bank itself can be made a party.
Most prominent among these quesWe publish the above, cases together,
and propose to follow them with a few tions, are those relating to the rights and
observations touching the general sub- power of the states with respect to the
public stocks of the United States.
ject to which they relate.
Questions concerning taxation are asCertain points are definitely settled,
suming an unusual degree of importance. and we pass them by with simply a brief
Some of these questions are complicated statement.
with others relating to the respective
Thus it is clear by the language of the
powers of the General and State Govern- Act of Congress and settled by adjudiments. And some are further compli- cation, that United States stocks held or
cated with considerations connected with ownek by natural persons or by corpothe nature of corporations and the own- rations are not subject to taxation by or
ership of corporate property and shares. under state authority.
Thus not only is the vast amount of
Quite recently questions of this character have been investigated with the pene- property, which is invested in the stocks
trating gaze of close scrutiny, with of the United States, withdrawn from the
watchful circumspection and deliberate range of state or municipal taxation,
but also the income which the citizen
care.
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derives from it, at least until it is received in money or converted into other
property.
This much being settled, questions of
vast amount soon arose as to the right
of the states to levy and collect taxes
from national banks, a certain portion
of whose capital must be, and all of
whose capital in many cases is, actually
invested in these securities.
It is clear, and it was accordingly
determined, that so far as these banks in
their own corporate right were the owners of such stock they were not, any
more than individual owners, liable to
state taxation in respect thereto or to
the income derivable therefrom. But
does this exemption from liability to
state taxation extend to the shares of the
shareowners in banks, all or a portion
of whose capital is invested in these nontaxable securities ? This question was
settled against the shareholder and in
favor of the States by the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in
the leading case of Van Allen v. Nlan
et al., published soon afterwards in the
Ar. L W REGISTER, Vol. 5 N. S. 609,
and now reported, 3 Wallace 573.
The substance of that decision and a
brief outline of the arguinent of the
Court are condensed in the head-note
prepared by the writer and given in the
report of the case as published in this
Journal. For convenience we now restate the principal points established by
the judgment of the Court in that case.
It decided, 1. That state laws authorizing the taxation of shares in national
banks must conform to the 41st section
of the Act of Congress of June 3d, 1864.
2d. That, when thus conformed, shares
in national banks may be taxed, like
other property belonging to the shareholder, by state authority, irrespective
(and this was the close, difficult, and
great controverted question in the case)
of the amount of capital which the bank
itself may have invested in bonds of the

United States-the Chief Justice and a
minority of the Court holding that
states may tax such shares only so far
as the capital of the bank .is not invested
in such securities.
The majority view evidently rests
upon this proposition, viz. : that the
shares in, and the capital of a bank are
not so far identical, that a tax on the
one is necessarily a tax on the other.
Therefore, although the whole capital
of a bank may, as in the Van Allen
Case, consist of stocks and bonds, issued
by the United States under various Acts
of Congress, still the shareholder, though
not the bank, may be taxed by the state
upon the value of his shares, provided
no discrimination is made by state,
legislation against this kind of property,
that is, provided it is not taxed higher
than other moneyed capital, or higher
than shares in banks organized under
state authority. Although the judgment of the Court of Appeals of New
York was reversed, yet the decision was
against the banks or rather the shareholders, aud will have the effect, to a great
extent, to compensate, so to speak, the
states for the withdrawal of so large a
porton'of property from their power to
tax.
And the immedliate point on which the
Van Allen Case turned was that a state
law, providing for the taxation of shares
in the national banks, and for the taxation of the capital of state banks, but
not of the shares, did not conform to
the limitations in the 41st section of the
Act of Congress of June 3d 1864, and
was therefore invalid.
The right under their existing laws to
tax the shares in national banks has
arisen or will most likely arise in the
different states.
The case of Bradley v. The People,
1c., above given, illustrates the application of the principles of the Van Allen
Case to the existing laws of the state of
Illinois. When the Van Allen Case
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arose, the banks of- the state of New
York were taxed upon their capital.
In Illinois, when the Bradley Case
arose, the banks of that state were taxed
upon their capitalstock and surplusfunds,
or reserved profits ; and there was no
provision specifically taxing shares in
such banks.
The Supreme Court of illinois, with
full knowledge of the decision in the
Van Allen Case, distinguished the two
cases, and asserted the power and right
of the state to tax the shares in the
national banks.
But the Supreme Court of the United
States reversed this judgment, and held
that the two cases were substantially the
same.
We herewith also publish the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the case on the relation of
Denning Duer, as containing an exposition of the construction of the first
proviso of the 41st section of the National Bank Act, prohibiting the taxation
of shares by state authority C1ata greater
rate than is assessed upon other moneyed
,capital in the hands of individual citizens."
In Indiana the question of the power
to tax the shares in national banks arose
and was decided by the Supreme Court
of that state against the power, in the
very recent case of Wright, Auditor, 6-c.,
v. Stilz, herewith published. The
grounds of this decision are given in the
following extract from the opinion of the
court, which was delivered by F"AzEn,
J. He says : "But under existing laws
the shares in national banks cannot be
taxed in this state for state and county
purposes, for the plain reason that no
tax is ' imposed upon the shares of any
of the banks organized under the authority of the state,' and the Act of Congress therefore forbids it. We tax our
own banks upon their paid-in capital,
and do not tax the shareholders thereof
upon the value of their shares. We

would by imposing this burden upon the
shareholders of the national banks alone,
make the discrimination against the latter, which the national legislature has,
in express terms, prohibited."
So, in New Hanpshire(FirstNational
Bank v. Portsmouth, 47 N. H., not yet
issued), it has been decided that while
national banks may be taxed upon their
real estate, they cannot be taxed, under
state laws, for the shares of any of their
stockholders.
In Ohio, banks chartered by the state
are assessed upon their capital stock,
undivided profits, and all other means
not forming part of their capital. In
April, 1865, the -legislature passed a
law which requires "all shares of stock
in any national bank, located within the
state, to be listed for taxation and taxed
in the city or county in which the bank
is located." There seems to be no provision specifically taxing shares in the
state banks.
Under this legislation, it was held by
the Superior Court of Cincinnati (Parker v. Siebern and .razer v. Siebern, 5
Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 526), that shares
in national banks could lawfully be taxed
in that state. This decision was made
before that of Bradley v. The People,
supra, and has now been reversed by the
Supreme Court of that state in the case
of Frazer v. Siebern, herewithpublished.
The laws of Ohio and Illinois, as to the
taxation of state banks, are identical,
and, by the decisions now published, the
judicial interpretations of them in the
two states have been harmonized. It is
proper to add, that in Parkerv. Siebern,
in the lower court, the point in relation
to the conformity of the state law with
the requirements of the 41st section of
the National Bank Act, does not seem to
have been particularly pressed by counsel, or considered by the court. The
stress of the case appears to have been
upon the question., whether, in estimating
the value of the shares, it was requisite
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to deduct that portion of the capital or
property which was invested in nontaxable stocks of the United States; and
the courts, conformably to the doctrine
of the Van Allen -Case, correctly ruled
that it was not.
Similar questions have arisen in other
states, but we have not authentic data
upon which to base particular reference
to them; and such a question is now
pending on appeal in the Supreme Court
of Iowa. The cases herewith published,
show that. the Supreme Court of the
United States will adhere to the dctrines of the Van Allen Case.
-Many of the states under their existing laws cannot lawfully tax shares in
the national banks. This defect may, it
is obvious, be remedied in either of two
modes. . irst, By the states so altering
their revenue laws as clearly to conform
to the limitations or conditions of the
41st section of the National Bank Act.
Scond, By a modification of that section
to be made by Congress, which it a4 the
right to do.
'Upon this point, we make the following extract from a published letter of the
Hon. 0., H. Mnrmn, State Auditor of
Illinois, a gentleman who has given to
this general subject no inconsiderable
attention. He concludes the letter referred to thus :'- u blshed debates in Congress
show it to have been the intention to
rende the national banks subject to state
taxation, and the 41st section of the
National Bank Law carries to the eye.a
seeming of such liability ; but under the
rulings of the Supreme Court this proves
to b. a delusion and a snare.

"As Congress has expressly reserved
the power to alter, amend, or even
repeal the act, it may well be asked
why it is impossible for Congress to
remedy the evils arising under the delusive promises of this law. It seems to
me that a few honest words in lieu of the
present provision of the act would end
the difficulty. Let it provide that the
capital stock, or shares of the same, may
be taxed under the laws of the states
where such banks are located, in the
same manner, at the same or no greatei
rate than the capital stock or shares of
banks authorized by the laws of such
states, or, in case that no binks are
authorized by the laws of the state in
which any such bank is located, then at
the same or no greater rate than is
assessed against other moneyed capital
in the same locality under the laws of
such state; with the proviso, that if the
banks are taxed directly on capital stock
in the aggregate, then the shares in the
hands of individuals shall be eqempt,
and vice versa. With such an amendmeant to the-National Baik Law, I fully
believe that the whole difficulty would
be at an end."
Since the foregoing was in type, we
have been furnished with a copy of the
lucid opinion of Justice AGmw, of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, upon
the statute of that state on this subject.
As we give the opinion in full below,
we shall only add here, that it furnishes
another example of the difficulty ofestablishing a simple and satisfactory mode
of exercising the power of taxation of
national banks, intended by Congress to
be allowed to the states.
J. F. D.
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
MARKOE ET AL. v. IIARTRANFT ET AL.
The shares of stockholders in national banks can only be taxed by a state, in
strict conformity with the provisions of the National Bank Act of June 1864.
A state law directing the cashiers of all banks, national or state, to collect
annually from every stockholder a tax of one per cent. on the par value of the
stock held by him, and pay the same into the state treasury, does not conform in
the mode of taxation with the requirements of the National Bank Act of June
1864, and is therefore void.
A state has no authority to impose such a duty upon an officer of a national
bank.
An injunction will lie from this court to restrain the auditor-general and treasurer of the state from collecting a tax under an unconstitutional law.

JXisi PRius.

In equity.

Demurrer to plaintiffs' bill.

Opinion by AGNEW, J.
The plaintiffs' bill seeks to restrain the auditor-general and
state treasurer from settling an account, and collecting the tax
imposed by the Act of 23d February 1866, in these words:"That from and after the passage of this act, it shall be the
duty of the cashier of every bank in this Commonwealth, whether incorporated under the laws of this state or of the United
States, to collect annually from every stockholder of said bank a
tax of one per centum upon the par value of the stock held by
said stockholders, and pay the same into the state treasury on or
before the 1st day of July in every year thereafter, commencing
on the 1st day of July, A. D. 1866, and the said bank shall be
exempt from all other taxation under the laws of this Commonwealth."
The defendants have demurred to the whole bill on three
grounds:-

1. Want of jurisdiction.
2. The existence of a complete remedy at law.
8. Want of equity on the merits.
The first cause of demurrer will depend on the determination
of the last. I shall therefore consider the grounds argued in their
inverse order.
The able argument of the attorney-general, when analyzed,
presents the authority to tax under the Act of 1866 in this
aspect :-That the state, by its enabling Act of 22d August 1864,
permitted the state banks to surrender their charters and come in
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under the Federal Bank Act of 3d June 1864, upon the faith that
the capital of its citizens in those banks should remain subject to
state taxes: that the right of the state to impose the tax, reserved
to it under the 41st section of.the Act of Congress, carries with
it all the means; and that the Act of 1866 was therefore a valid
exercise of the state authority.
The error in this argument lies in its oversight of the incompatibility of the mode of taxation presented by the Act of 1866,
with the mode authorized by the Act of Congress. This will
appear by considering the question upon three points:1. The subject reserved by Congress for state taxation.
*2. The mode prescribed for its exercise.
3. The mode adopted in the Act of 1866.
The subject of taxation is clearly stated in the first proviso of
the 41st section of the United States Bank Act of 3d June 1864,
to be the shares of the individual shareholder. The personal
interest of the stockholder in the shares he owns, as contradistinguished from that of the corporation in its capital and property,
was considered and determined by the Supreme Court of this
state in the case of McKeen v. Northampton County, 13 Wright
519, and accords with the doctrine of the later decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States in reference tor
the subject
now before me. This interest is personal, goes with him, and its
succession when he dies is governed by the law of his domicil.
It is clearly distinguishable from the capital and property of the
corporation, which are vested in it as the legal or artificial entity
and owner, and are subject to the laws of the state which gave it
being. The 41st section of the Bank Act of 1864 is framed in
view of this distinction. It first imposes certain taxes upon the
corporation-association as it is termed--" in lieu of all existing
taxes.". Then the first proviso declares that nothing in the act
shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of the said
corporations held by 'any person from being included in the valuation, of the personal property of such person in the assessment of
taxes imposed by or under state authority. After this comes the
third proviso, subjecting the real estate of the association or corporate body to state taxation.
The individual character of this personal interest in the shares
of these associations, as taxable apart from the institutions themselves, is fully sustained by the bank tax cases in the Supreme
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Court of the United States, 3 Wallace 573, 585, 586 ; and is reasserted by Justice NELSON in The People of New York ex rel.
luer v. Commissioners, &c. (ante, p. 467), in which it was held,
resulting from this distinction, that the ownership of the shares
was so clearly different from that of the corporation in its capital,
the shareholders could obtain no deduction from their valuation
for that portion of the capital invested in United States bonds.
The nature of the taxable interest in the shares bears directly
upon the mode of taxation provided by Congress, which is the
second point. As thus understood, the first proviso will read
thus: "That nothing in the act shall prevent the individual personal interest of the shareholder in his shares from being included
in the valuation of the personal property of such person in the
assessment of taxes imposed by or under state authority." We
cannot reject these words "1from being included in the valuation
of the personal property of such person." Congress meant something by this language. It did not say that nothing shall prevent
such shares from being taxed by or under state authority. That
would. have left the mode of exercising this authority to the states.
But the operative words are, "1nothing shall prevent them from
being included in the valuation of the personal property of the
person holding the shares." Here is a defined mode authorized,
and this and no other can be pursued. The state must, therefore,
proceed by taxation directly upon the shareholder, by including
his stock in the valuation of his other personal estate.
But not to stick in the letter, there is good reason for adopting
this mode. If by omitting to prescrile a mode, the authority to tax
the shares in the national banks could be exercised by compelling
the payment of the tax over the counter of the bank itself, it
would subject the bank to a quasi foreign and sometimes hostile
jurisdiction. This is evidently not intended by Congress. It
would also subject the citizens of other states and countries to
taxation upon a moneyed capital never brought within state jurisdiction, otherwise than by the purchase of the shares. It might
also subject these non-resident shareholders to double taxation-at
home, by including their shares in the valuation of their personal
estate, and here, by payment over the counter of the bank. The
effect of this would be also to drive foreign capital from use in
institutions located in our midst. Impartiality in the exercise of
the Federal power, therefore, required that the. states should be
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limited in the mode as well as in the extent of the taxing power
conceded to them under this proviso. In the clause fixing this
extent, the mode is again referred to. It is to be at no greater
rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital, in the hands of
individual citizens of the state. To this is to be added the provision in the 40th section for the keeping of a full and correct list
of the names, residences, and the number of shares of all the
stockholders, which the section declares shall be subject to the
inspection of the officers -authorized to assess taxes under state
authority. Thus the precise duty of the bank, in reference to the
taxation -f 'shares, is defined to be that of furnishing to the state
officers the means of making- the assessment by inspection, but the
assessment of the shares is clearly referred to the officer autho-.
rized. to assess. I have, so far, left out of view these words in
the proviso - "At the place where such bank is located, and not
elsewhere." It is very difficult to assign the true connection and
xelation of 'these words in the sentence. I think, however, their
purpose is not to localize the assessment of the taxes at the place
'whre the bank is located, but to localize the authority which
imloses the tax. To localize the assessment at the place where
*he bank would be either lo confine the assessment to the bank
itself -n behalf of its shareholders, or to confine it to the shareliolders -residing at the place where the btk is located. The
-formeris inconsistent-with the express words of the remainder of
the sentence requiring the .share to be included in the valuation
9E the personal property of the shareholder, and the' single duty
imposed upon the bank of fui'nishing the list of names, residences,
and number of shares, for the inspection of the assessor. ' The
latter would be, at least, consistent with the- intent to' assess the
individual shareholders, but savors of injustice in exempting other
shareholders 'residing outside of the place where the bank is
located. I would prefer, therefore, to connect locality with the
authority which immediately precedes and stands connected with
it; ,but if this cannot be done, the language can be harmonizea
only by confining the assessment of shares to those living within
the place 'where the bank has-its location. My conclusion is, that
Congress intended to confine the exercise of the authority of each
state to the taxation of its own citizens individually, by including
their shares in the valuation and assessment of their personal
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estate. See Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wallace (U. S. Rep.)
585, 586, 587.
In the third place, what is the operation of taxation in the
mode proposed in the State Act of 1866, as understood by the
auditor-general ? Its effect is to transform the national association into a state agent, and to compel it to perform a burdensome
duty not enjoined by its charter, without authority and without
compensation. This is done by making it the duty of its officers
to collect the tax annually from every stockholder and to pay it
into the state treasury. It also depreciates the stock to the extent
of the burden imposed on the*corporation.
In the next place, it compels payment of taxes by non-residents,
whose capital was not before the subject of taxation, and who may.
be compelled to pay a personal tax on the same shares at home.
Clearly this is contrary to the whole scope and intent of the Bank
Act, and to the particular provisions of- the 41st section.
A state corporation deriving its power and privileges from the
law may be regulated and controlled by it. But a national bank
derives neither its existence nor its franchises from the state, and
therefore owes it no special duty., and. cannot be burdened .by an
imposition upon its privileges. It is unlike, in this respect, a
foreign corporation, which can exercise its functions here only by
permission of the state. The supreme authority of the Union
which establishes it here also protects it from interference. The
state may send her assessor to the shareholder, and to find him
out the assessor may call on the bank for information, for this is
permitted. But what right has the state to compel the bank to
act as her agent in collecting the taxes from the shareholders, and
to burden it with the trouble and expense and responsibility of
collecting and paying them over into the state treasury? What
remedy has the bank against the shareholder if he refuses to pay,
or previously assigns over his shares or dividends ? The tax is.
not a specific lien on the stock or the dividends.
The Act of 1866 provides no mode for its enforcement either
against the bank or the stockholder. This brings us to consider
what authority can be exercised by the auditor-general under the
Act of 30th March 1811, by the settlement of a tax account against
the bank or the stockholder. That act extends to all persons or
corporations intrusted with the receipt or coming into the possession of public moneys. State corporations, when made the receivers
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of taxes on their stock or dividends, may therefore be compelled
to settle accounts before the auditor-general: Easton Bank v.
Coutts, 10 Barr 442; Commonwealth v. Bunk, 2 Casey 235.
The Act of 1866 was obviously intended to bring the national
banks within the operation of this law, as they are expressly
classed with the state banks. It is not the stockholder, but the
corporation, which is subjected to the duty. According to the
doctrine of Commonwealth v. Bunk, supra, an account may be
settled for the tax agaiiist the bank without previous notice to
appear; and the bank becomes fixed for the sum stated in the
account unless it files an appeal within sixty days after the notice
of the settlement, and a specification of the objections ; .and security to prosecute the appeal with effect. In this way the corporation,.not the individual stockholder, is compelled to submit itself
to state jurisdiction and process, and to perform an illegal, burdensome, and expensive duty, without any provision for recourse
against the stockholders. In effect, this is to compel the banks to
pay a tax contrary to the provisions of the forty-first section of
the Act of Congress, and to involve the consequences already
stated.
It is equally clear that, under the provisions of the Act of 1866,
the- auditor-general cannot compel the individual stockholder to
settle an account for the tax. No provisioik is made for reaching
him; but the duty of collecting and paying over is devolved upon
the officers of the bank. Besides, individuals who hold no office
and no franchises of the state, and who are not receivers of public
money, but mere tax-payers, have never been held to be within
the provisions of the Act of 1811. As to them the state has
always collected her taxes through tax officers. It would be
inconvenient and burdensome upon the state department to settle
accounts with every individual, tax-payer, and it would be highly
unjust to the citizens themselves to transfer the settlement and
payment of their taxes to the seat of government. Persons falling within the provisions of the Act of 1811 are required to
appear upon summons before the auditor-general, and to settle
their accounts -at his office. Then again, if the bank submit to
the state jurisdiction, and pay the tax, the stockholder is withotit
remedy if the payment be erroneous. The settlement being with
the bank and not with the stockholder, he cannot appeal. As to
the bank, the settlement would be in solido for the whole tax, and
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the individual tax would not appear separately. At all events, he
is no party, his name being unknown in the settlement. He cannot sue the state to recover back his tax, and if he could recover
it from the bank as a mispayment, it can only be on the ground
that the bank was not amenable to the state jurisdiction.
What I have said shows that the plaintiffs, as individual stockholders, have no complete remedy at law, which disposes of the
second cause of demurrer, and brings me to consider the first,
whether the court has jurisdiction to enjoin against officers of the
state.
That the court has jurisdiction results from the conclusion that
there is no authority on the part of the auditor-general and state
treasurer to settle the account and compel payment of the taxes
imposed by the Act of 1866. The law is in conflict with the Act
of Congress, and is therefore void by force of the 2d section of
the 6th article of the Constitution of the United States. Such
being the case, the attempt to collect the tax by the proposed settlement of an account under the Act of 1811, is illegal and without authority. The state cannot be sued; and if the court do
not interfere, and the tax be collected and paid over by the cashier,
there is no remedy either to the bank or the stockholder. It is a
case of void authority, not of irregularity in the exercise of lawful
authority, or of a mere discretion. This case is almost identical
with that of Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheaton 739.
The right to grant an injunction in such a case is borne out by
many authorities :-JPearvinv. Lewis, 4 Mylne & Craige 254;
Miller v. Gorman, 2 Wright 312; Mott v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 6 Casey 9; Kerr v. Trego, 11 Wright 292; Mayor and
Councils of Baltimore v. Porter, 18 Maryland 801; Bonaparte
v. Camden and Amboy Railroad Co., Baldwin's Rep. 205; Belknap v. Belknap, 2 Johnson's Chancery 463; Hilliard on Injunctions, ed. 1865, 374.
The demurrer is overruled, and the defendants ordered to answer
to the bill.

ERICKSGN V. NESMITH.

Supreme Court of New ffampshire.
ERICKSON, LIVERMORE & CO. v. JOHN NESMITH AND OTHERS.
Where a bill in equity is brought against the stockholders of.a corporation foi
the purpose of charging them personally, upon individual liability, for the debt of
the corporation, an equitable contribution is to be made by the court between all
the stockholders as far as may be.
Our statute makes the liability of stockholders in manufacturing and many other.
corporations, joint and several'for all such debts of the corporation as they are
made personally liable Io pay, thusmakling them liable as though they were part4era without any act of incorporation.
The rule among'partners is, if after applying the assets there are still outstanding liabilities, the partners must cofitribute'in proportiou to their shares, or if there
is a surplus, it will be distributed among them in like proportion.
Where a bill -in,6ancery is brought against any of the stockholders of a corporation to cqmpe them to pay a debt of the corporation for which they are individually liable, the general rule is, that all persons' liable to contribute should be
made parties-to the bill;
But this is a rule of convenience and not of necessity, and when persons interested are out of the Jurisdiction of the court, and it is so stated in the bill and
admitted by the answer or proved, it is not necessary to make, them paities, but a
decree may be made against those over whom the court has acquired jurisdiction,

where it can be done without injustice to those absent.
And where certainof thestockholders within the jurisdiction are insolvent, the,

plaintiff may have his decree against such as are solvent for his whole debt, each
paying such proportion of the whole debt ai his stock bears to the whole-amount
of stock owned by the solvent stockholders, over who&a the court has acquired
jurisdiction.

THIS is a bill in equity brought against the stockliolders of a
corporation called the Franklin Mills, designed to charge the
defendants personally on their individual liability for the debt of
the corporation due to -the.plaintiffs,
There are several defendants, stockholders, some of whom are

residents of this state, and appear by their attorneys of record.

Others are residents of other states, upon whom service of the
bill has been taken pio eonfe8e. Some of the defendants, both
within and without the state, are pecuniarily solvent and others
are insolvent.
For the purpose of avoiding unnecessary litigation, delay, and
expense, the parties pray the advice of the court upon the following questions, namely:May a decree for judgment be taken against any one or number
of the defendants, at the option of the plaintiffs, or will the court
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order that judgment shall be rendered against each defendant for
such sum as the number of shares of corporation stock owned by
him bears relatively to the entire debt of the plaintiffs ?
If specific decree be made according to this plan of relative
proportion, may the debt be divided upon that basis among the
solvent stockholders, or must all the stockholders of both classes
be included-the solvent stockholders having right of contribution
against those not included in the distribution ?
It is also agreed that prior to the commencement of this suit,
the plaintiffs brought their action in Massachusetts, against those
of the present defendants there residing, for the purpose of enforcing in that state the individual liability of those defendants; that
after full consideration by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts,
the plaintiffs' action was dismissed for the reason assigned in the
opinion of the court, that the corporation being located in New
Hampshire, the plaintiffs' remedy was local and confined to New
Hampshire.
Whereupon this bill was brought and the Massachusetts defendants were served with notice thereof, and failed to appear as before
stated.
Upon their default will the court, without other evidence, than
proof of the plaintiffs' just claims against the corporation, order
judgment against the Massachusetts defendants in either of the
ways suggested in the foregoing inquiries ?
George, Poster, and Sanborn, for the plaintiffs
Minat, AHugridge, and Pike, for Nesmith & Co.
SARGENT, J.'-Upon this case, as stated, certain questions are
raised. All the preliminary proceedings are passed over without
question. We are to assume that the corporation in this case has
so conducted its business as to make its stockholders liable under
the provisions of our statute for the payment of the corporate
debts, and that this plaintiff has taken all the preliminary steps
required by the statute against the corporation, in order to entitle
him to bring his suit against the individual stockholders.
The Revised Statutes, chap. 146, § 2, Comp. L. 313, provide
that "1proper actions of debt or assumpsit for the collection of
such debts or liabilities may be commenced and prosecuted against
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any one or more of said stockholders, and such actions shall not
be abated for the reason that the other stockholders are not joined
as defendants in such suits."
Sec. 5 of the same chap., Comp. L. 314, provides that "when
any stockholder of such company shall have voluntarily paid any
such debt or liability, after such demands, or where any such
stockholaer shall have been compelled by suit to pay any such
debt or libbility out of his own private property, he may have contribution from the other stockholders of such company for all payments so made by him, either by an action for money paid, laid
out, and expended, or by a bill in equity, at his elebtion."
-By these provisions the creditor of the corporation could recover
his whole debt from any oie or more of the stockholders, and such
stockholders were to seek contribution from their fellows. But
by the law of 1857, Pamph. L., chap. 1962, it is provided "that
all legal proceedings hereafter commenced against any individual
stockholder in any corporatiou in this state, for the collection of a
debt against said corporation, shall be by a bill in chancery, and
not otherwise.'"
By this statute it was designed to compel the creditor to make
all the stockholders parties to his bill, if practicable, and not to
allow him to pursue his remedy against any one, and collect his
whole debt from such single stockholder, when there were others
equally liable with himself, who could properly, and who should,
in a bill of equity, be joined with him: Hadley v. Russell, 40 N.
H. 109. By that course of proceeding it would be legs oppressive
upon any one of the stockholders than if the whole debt, however large, might be first collected of him to the full extent
of all his means at least, and he be left to obtain his contribution
from the other sgockholders.
It being thus the design that all the stockholders should be
made parties as far as it could be done, it was, we think, undoubt-edly the design also that thecour should order such contribution
amongst such stockholders as would be equitable in raising the
money to pay such claim.
If it were to be held that judgment might be decreed upon a
bill in equity agaimst one or more of such stockholders, at the
option of the plaintiff, for the whole amount of his claim, the
change in the law substituting a bill in chancery for an action of
debt or assumysit accomplished nothing except to change the form
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of process. But something more than this was evidently intended.
Where any claim is thus sued an equitable contribution is to
be made by the court between all the stockholders as far as
may be.
By an Act of 1846, Pamph. L., chap. 321, the liability of
stockholders was made joint and several for certain specified
debts which they were made personally liable to pay in all corporations having for their object a division of profits among their
stockholders; while in banks they were made severally liable for
an amount equal to their stock in such bank for all its debts:
Comp. Laws 812-331. The law thus makes the stockholders in
such a corporation as this answerable for certain debts in the same
capacity as though they were partners, placing them on the same
footing in that respect as though they had not been incorporated:
Allen v. Sewell, 2 Wend. 327; Mfass v. Oakley, 2 Hill 265;
Bailey v. Bancker, 8 Id. 188; Ang. & A. on Corp., chap. 17,
§ 591, et seg.; Hass v. Averell, 10 N. Y. (6 Selden) 449;
Corning v. McCulloek, 1 Com. 47; Abbott v. Aspinwall, 26
Barb. S. C. R. 207 ; ifargerv. JcCulloek, 2 Denio 128; Southmayd v. Buss, 3 Conn. 52 ; Bank v. Magill, 5 Id. 28; Marcy
v. Clark, 17 Mlass. 334; Thtayer v. Union Tool Co., 4 Gray 75;
Rev. Stats. ch. 146, § 1.
The rule for contribution among partners is well settled. If,
after applying the assets, there are still outstanding liabilities, the
partners must contribute in proportion'to their shares; and if, on
the other hand, a surplus remains it will be distributed among them
in like proportion: Adams' Equity 243 ; Vose v. Grant, 15 Mass.
505; Ang. & A. on Corp., § 591, et seq.
Applying these principles, then, to the case before us, the
decree should be entered against all the stockholders in the corporation; each stockholder paying the same proportion of the
whole debt as the amount of his stock or number of his shares
bears to the whole amount of stock or the whole number of shares
in the corporation, subject to a qualification on account of nonresident and insolvent stockholders, which it becomes necessary
here to considerr
We have already stated the general rule to be applied in bills
of chancery like this, which is, that all parties liable to contribute
should be made defendants unless they are already joined as
plaintiffs.
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All the authorities recognise this as the, general rule: 2 Story
Eq. Juris., § 1526; 2 Mad. Ch. Pr. 222, 238; Daniel's Oh. Pl.
& Pr. 329; Wiser v. Blakely, 1 Johnson's Ch. 437;.Hadley v.
_ussell, 40 N. H., supra. But to this general rule there are
some exceptions. When persons interested are out of the juris:
diction of the court, and it is so stated in the bill and admitted by
the defendants' answer or proved, it is not necessary to make them
parties: 2 Mad. Ch. Pr. 219, 222.
In Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 167, it is said by the
Supreme Court of the United States "that the rule which requires
that all .persons concerned in interest, however remotely, should
be made parties to the suit, though applicable to most cases in the
courts of the United States is not applicable to all. In the exercise Qf its discretion, the court ;Fill require the plaintiff to do all
in his power to bring every person concerned in interest before
the court. But if the case may be completely decided, as between
the litigant parties, the circumstance that an interest exists in
some other person whom the process of the court cannot reach, as
if such party be the resident of some other state, ought not to
prevent a decree upon its merits. It would be a misapplication
of the rule to dismiss the plaintiffs' bill because he has not done
that which the law will not enable him to do."
And in Hallow v. inde, 12 Wheat. 19 , the same court, in
speaking of this principle, say, " In that case (Elmendorf v.
Taylor), the right of the party before the court did not depend
upon the right of the party not before the court; each of their
rights stood upon its own independent basis, and the ground upon
which it was necessary, according to the general principle, to
have both before the, court, was to avoid multiplicity of suits, and
to have the whole matter settled at once.". 11 In this case (Mallow
v. Hinde), the complainants have no rights separable from and
independent of the rights of persons not made parties. The
rights of those not before the court lie at the very foundation of
the claim of right by the plaintiffs, and a final decision cannot be
made between the parties litigant without directly affecting and
prejudicing the rights df others not made parties:" For this reason the latter bill was dismissed, but the former was sustained,
even though certain parties living out of the state, and who for
that reason could not be made parties, were interested, and though
there might be occasion for further litigation in order to adjust

-
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the whole subject-matter between all parties interested: 2 Story
Eq. Juris. § 1526 ; Ohabners v. Hack, 19 'aine 124.
Service of a sub1 xena to appear and answer made out of jurisdiction is a nullity, and proceedings founded thereon will be set
aside: Creede v. Bjyrne, 1 Hogan (Irish R.) 79; -Dunn v.
_Dunn, 4 Paige 425. So it is stated in Lord REDESDALE'S Treatise on Pleading that "When a person who ought to be a party
is out of the jurisdiction of the court, that fact being stated in
the bill, and admitted by the defendant or proved on the hearing,
is in most cases a sufficient reason for not bringing him before the
court:" Daniel's Ch. P1. & Pr. 238.
In Towle v. Pierce, 12 Met. 329, there was a demurrer to a
bill in chancery. WiLDE, J., says, "The principal cause of demurrer to the bill is that all the persons interested in the subjectmatter of the suit are not made parties, so that it would be perfectly safe for the defendant to obey the decree prayed for. To
this the answer is, that the other persons named in the bill who
were partners with the plaintiff and the defendant are not within
the jurisdiction of the court, and this we consider a sufficient
answer." And a decree was made in the case between the
plaintiff and defendant, two partners, in the absence of two others
who had also been partners with them, and as such interested in
the matters in controversy.
Mr. Justice STORY says: "The general rule is, that to a bill
against a partnership, all the partners must be- made parties; but
if one of the partners be resident in a foreign country so tlhat he
cannot be brought- before the court, and the fact is so charged in
the bill, the court will ordinarily proceed to make a decree against
the partners who are within the jurisdiction, with this qualification,
however, that it can be done without manifest injustice to the
absent partner :" Story's Eq. Pl. § 78; Daniel's Oh. P1. & Pr.
233* and 234*.
In the case before us the plaintiffs, it would seem, have! done
everything in their power to make all the members of the corporation whom they are seeking to charge, parties to their bill. And
the fact that these parties living out of the jurisdiction, do not
come in after notice, instead of operating as a reason why the bill
should be dismissed and that there should thus be an entire failure
of justice, affords a good and sufficient reason why a decree
should be made for judgment in favor of the plaintiffs against
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those defendants who are within the jurisdiction, if it can be done
without injustice to those who are not parties.
An order for judgment against those who are parties to the bill
cannot in this case prejudice- the rights of those who are not so,
because all that the defendants who are now parties to this bill
and residents in this state can do against those out of the state is
to make them contribute their just proportion to the payment of
this debt, which is just what we should compel them to do if they
were here now as parties. Their refusing to come in here as
parties to this suit will only render two or probably several suits
ilecessary instead of one, to settle the whole matter in controversy
between all interested ; but it will not change or affect their ultimate rights or liabilities at all, whether they be settled in one
suit or several.
The rule that all parties liable to a demand should be before
the court, was a rule of convenience to prevent further suits for
a contribution, and not a rule of necessity, and therefore might
be dispensed with, especially when the parties were many, and
the delays might be multipliea and continued; and the rule has
been dispensed with in a variety of cases where the ends of justice could be sufficiently answered by a sufficient number being
before the court to represent the rights of all: 1 Daniel's Ch. P1.
& Pr. 819-20i and cases cited and note.
In Smith v. The Hibernian Mine Co., 1 Sch. & Lef. 540,
-Lord REDEsDAT says: "The ordinary practice of courts of
equity when one party is out of the jurisdiction and other parties
within it, is to charge the fact in the bill that such a person is out
of the jurisdiction, and then the court proceeds against the other
parties, notwithstanding he is not before it."
And where a bill was filed for the recovery of a joint debt,
against one of two partners, the other being out of the kingdom,
the question before the court was whether the defendant should
pay the whole or only a moiety'of the debt. Lord HAnnwICxc
was of the opinion- that he ought to pay the whole, holding that
when a defendant cannot be made to appear, it amounts to the
same thing as if process had been taken out for want of an
appearance and carried on to a sequestration: Darwent v. Walton,
2 At.'kins 510. So here we think there should be judgment against
those stockholders in this state for the whole amount of the plain.
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tiffs' debt, and they be left to their remedy against those stockholders out of the state for contribution.
But it is claimed that by express provision of a statute or by a
rule of court having the force of law, service may be made on a
person residing out of the state, so as properly to make him a
party to a suit pending here; and Stone v. Anderson, 25 N. H.
221, is cited as authority.
In that case there was service under the rule of court upon two
persons residing in Boston, the service having been made by
a private individual, but properly sworn to under the rule. These
two defendants appeared by counsel and objected that no proper
and legal service had been made upon them. They did not object
to the jurisdiction of the court or that no service could be made
on them out of the jurisdiction, but voluntarily appearing, and
only objecting to the form of the service, which was held sufficient, their objection was answered and their clients were properly
in court, because they chose to come instead of relying upon their
rights and staying away.
We find in all the elementary books, rules for making extra.
ordinary or substituted service on parties out of the jurisdiction;
but upon examination we find that the statutes authorizing such
service have reference to those called absentees, who have a legal
residence in the state or country where the cause is pending, but
who have left to avoid personal service or for some other cause,
but who are still considered as inhabitants of such state or country, and where service on the attorney or agent of the party is
held to be good service on the principal under the peculiar circumstances of the case: 1 Daniel's Oh. P1.- & Pr. 500, 514, 515,
and note; Jermain v. Lan don, 8 Paige 41; BEvarts v. Becker,
Id. 506.
But where no attachment of property has been made withiu
the jurisdiction, and where the court can make no actual service
of process, and where the party residing in another state refuses
to submit to the jurisdiction of the court, we know of no way to
acquire such jurisdiction over the person. A statute could not
give it any more than a rule of court. The legislature have no
more jurisdiction to make laws for the inhabitants of other states
while remaining there than the court has to execute them upon
such inhabitants: Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 468; Bangeley v.
Webster, 11 N. H. 299, and cases cited.
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This subject, has recently been pretty fully considered by the
Supreme Court of the United States, in Baldwin v. Hall, 1 Wall.
223, s. c. 3 Am. Law Reg. 462, and Baldwin v. The Bank of
Newbury, 1 Wall. 234; and by this court in Bank v. Butler, 45
N. H. 236, 239.
One other question only remains. The case finds that certain
stockholders, both in New Hampshire and Massachusetts, are solvent, and others in both states are insolvent. Those who are
insolvent in Massachusetts stand upon the same ground as those
who are solvent.
They are neither of them parties here, as the court has acquired
no jurisdiction over them, and no decree can be made in relation
to them. In relation to those who are insolvent in New Hampshire., somebody must lose their share of the contribution or wait
until they are able to pay it.
Who shall thus lose, the stockholders or the creditors ? It
would be hardly equitable that the creditor should be compelled to
lose a part of his debt in consequence of a change in the form of
process, when the law before gave him his whole debt by suing one
or more, at his election, and provides that it shall be no defence
to his action that the other stockholders were not joined as party
defendants. The only equitable result to be arrived at is that
those of the stockholders who are able m ust pay the proportion
of those who are insolvent.
The result of the whole matter is, therefore, that the plaintiffs
may have a decree for judgment against such stockholders as are
properly made parties to this bill, or who have become or may
become parties thereto voluntarily, who are found to be solvent,
for the whole amount of their debt-and costs, to be apportioned
between them pra rata, according to the amount of stock owned
by each in said corporation; each paying such proportion of the
whole debt as his stock bears to the whole amount of stock owned
by the solvent stockholders hk are or m, be parties to the bill.
It will not be for the plaintiff w select such as he calls solvent,
and omit the rest; but the fact of solvency is to be settled upon
proof by the court or by a master.
The result of the suit in Massachusetts was what might have
been expected. The plaintiffs, in going to another state, to try to
enforce upon its inhabitants the special provisions of the laws of
New Hampshire, would be very likely to find their mistake; and

